

## Message Text

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S E C R E T AMMAN 3964

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, LE, JO,SY, XF

SUBJECT: TALK WITH KING - LEBANON SITUATION

REF: (A) AMMAN 3962, (B) AMMAN 3963

1. SUMMARY IN REFTEL (A). THIS TELEGRAM PROVIDES POINTS AS KING READ THEM TO ME OF PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON BY SYRIA AND PALESTINIANS, BUT STILL SWAITING FINAL APPROVAL OF PALESTINIAN HIGHER AUTHORITIES IN LEBANON. KING SAID HE ASSUMED TEXT HAD BEEN MADE AVAILABLE BY SYRIANS TO LEBANESE PARTIES.

2. PREAMBULAR LANGUAGE REFERRED TO OBJECTIVES OF STOPPING THE FIGHTING AND THE ARAB LEAGUE GOALS OF BRINGING PEACE TO LEBANON.

3. POINT ONE NOTED THE AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE OVER ALL OF LEBANON BY ALL OF THE PARTIES AND LEFT BLANKS FOR THE DAY AND HOUR IT WAS TO BEGIN TO BE FILLED IN LATER BY THE PARTIES.

4. THE SECOND POINT STATES THAT UNTIL THE ELECTED PRESIDENT ASSUMES OFFICE THE HIGHER SYRIAN-LEBANESE "PALESTINIAN" WAS ADDED LATER BY THE KING IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION), ASSISTED AS NECESSARY BY ARAB LEAGUE REPRESENTATIVES WILL SUPERVISE THE CEASEFIRE ESTABLISH SECURITY AND PREPARE A TIMETABLE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COLLECTION OF FIGHTING EQUIPMENT (ARMS) WITHIN ONE WEEK USING THE ARAB LEAGUE FORCE AND WHATEVER OTHER FORCES IT MAY SEE FIT TO  
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EMPLOY.

5. THE THIRD POINT HAS TWO PARGS. PART 3A. AFTER THE ELCTED PRESIDENT ASSUMES CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DO WHATEVER HE

CAN AND TAKE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS TO INSURE SECURITY AND CALM THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. PART 3B, IN REGARD TO THE LEBANESE SITUATION, STEMMING FROM A CONCERN FOR LEBANON, ITS PEOPLE AND TERRITORY, ITS INDEPENDENCE, UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY AND WITH THE EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION OF ALL SIDES INVOLVED, AND AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED TO BEGIN A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF REFORMS UNDER PRESIDENT SARKIS, WITH THE PAPER OF FEBRUARY 14, 1976 AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. THE KING ALSO SAID THAT THE POINT INDICATES PRESIDENT SARKIS IS TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR FORMING A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, REBUILDING THE COUNTRY, ORGANIZING AND UNIFYING THE ELEMENTS OF THE STATE AND CARRYING OUT THE REFORMS MENTIONED IN THE PAPER.

6. POINT 4 DEALS WITH THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS. LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS ARE TO BE WORKED OUT STEMMING FROM LEBANON'S RIGHT TO HAVE NO PALESTINIAN INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND THE RIGHT OF THE "RESISTANCE" TO CARRY ON ITS STRUGGLE FROM LEBANON IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LEBANES-RESISTANCE AGREEMENTS SET OUT IN THE SYRIAN PAPER ON LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS OF 14 FEBRUARY 1976 ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTIES, AND ALSO IN ACCORD WITH THE CAIRO AGREEMENT AND ALL OTHER RELATIVE AGREEMENTS. A LEBANSE-PALESTINIAN COMMITTEE IS TO SUPERVISE THE PROGRAM OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS.

7. THE KING ALSO MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE MATERIAL PRESENTED IN THIS CABLE AND REFTELS:

8. KING HAD RECEIVED NO SPECIAL REQUEST FOR HELP FROM SYRIA ALTHOUGH WE (US AND UK) COULD ASSUME THAT SYRIANS KNEW JORDAN WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH THEM. KING ADDED SYRIA NEEDED REASSURANCE FROM ITS FRIENDS. KING ALSO WAS CONSIDERING SENDING AN ENVOY TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH THE SAUDIS ALTHOUGH HE SEEMED TO HAVE LITTLE RELISH FOR THE TASK. THE KING ASKED THAT WE CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION WITH HIM. HE ALSO ALLUDED TO THE FACT THAT SYRIANS MIGHT BE IN TOUCH WITH THE US DIRECTLY.

9. KING REPEATED THAT ASAD HAD TURNED DOWN A SOVIET REQUEST FOR SECRET

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NAVAL FACILITIES IN SYRIA.

10. SYRIAN MADE THE POINT THAT THE SITUATION MAY WELL GET BEYOND THEIR ABILITY TO CONTROL IN SPEAKING OF SOVIET PRESSURES. KING SAID THAT HE WAS SURE FROM HIS VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION IN JUNE THAT MOSCOW LEADERS WERE DEEPLY UPSET WITH ASAD. HE SENSED THAT MOSCOW LEADERSHIP WAS UNDER SOME INTERNAL PRESSURE TO PROVE THAT IT HAD NOT SQUANDERED SOVIET RESOURCES IN DEALING WITH THE ARABS. ASAD HAD BEEN TOLD THAT HIS CONTINUING GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS WOULD BE BASED ON HIS CAPACITY TO SEE THEIR POINT OF VIEW OF THE LEBANESE PROBLEM AND ACT ACCORDINGLY. THE KING FELT THERE MIGHT BE SOME ELEMENTS OF DESPARATION IN SOVIET POSITION AND HOPED WE WOULD NOT OVERLOOK THIS POINT.

11. MY BRITISH COLLEAGUE ASKED KING WHY EGYPTIANS SEEMED TO BE PLAYING BALL WITH THE SOVIETS? KING SAID HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND IT. IT WAS PROBABLY TO GET BACK AT SYRIA AND WAS MOST SHORTSIGHTED ON THE PART OF SADAT.

12. KING FELT THAT IRAQ AND EGHPT HAD NO REAL COMMUNITH OF INTERESTS AND THAT IRAQIS WERE NOT PARTICULARLY FOND OF SOVIETS. SOVIET HE SAW TRYING TO CREATE A PRO-SOVIET TIER ACROSS THE MIDDLE EAST FROM LEBANON THROUGH IRAQ USING THE LEBANESE LEFT AS A WESTWARD ANCHOR. KING SAID THAT IF PROBLEM IS NOT RESOLVED IN LEBANON NEXT PLACE WHERE THERE WILL BE YROUBLE, BECAUSE OF LARGE RESIDENT PALESTINIAN POPULATION, WILL BE KUWAIT. KING ALSO INDICATED AGAIN THAT SHAH IS VERY WORRIED ABOUT BAHREIN. CROWN PRINCE HASAN HAD CALLED HIS FRIEND BAHREIN CROWN PRINCE AND LATER SAID THAT IF HASAN CAME FOR A VISIT HE WOULD COME BACK TO JORDAN WITH HASAN. APPARENTLY KING SAID THERE IS FAMILY FEUD GOING ON BETWEEN CROWN PRINCE AND HIS UNCLE THE RULER AND THAT HE SHOULD NOT MEDDLE. BUT HE AND SHAH ALSO THOUGHT IRQAIS WERE PUTTING IN ARMS.

13. ON ISRAELI BEHALF, KING SAID THAT HE THOUGH THE ISRAELI SO FAR HAD HANDLED THE SITUATION WELL. HOWEVER, IF THE ISRAELIS WERE EVENTUALLY BROUGHT TO INTERVENE AGAINST THE LEFT, IN APPARENT CONJUNCTION WITH SYRIA, THAT WOULD FINISH SYRIA IN THE ARAB WORLD.

14. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, KING REPEATED THAT SYRIANS ARE  
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SURE THERE ARE ALREADY SOME CUBANS AND EAST EUROPEANS IN LEBANON, BUT HE GAVE NO SPECIFICS.

15. KING SAID THAT HE THOUGHT SAUDIS WERE ONE POSSIBLE KEY TO FUTURE EGYPTIAN ACGIOS AND HE HOPED THAT THE US AND UK WOULD SPEAK TO THE SAUDIS ABOJT APPLYING SOME PRESSURE ON EGYPT TO ACT MORE RESPONSIBLY.

16. KING SAID THAT HE THOUGHT SYRIA HAD NOW PASSED THE CRITICAL LOW POINT IN ITS INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND WAS MUCH IMPROVED. MUCH OF THE TROUBLE STEMMED FROM THE PALESTINIANS AND THE OVER HALF A MILLION LEBANES REFUGEES IN SYRIA. THE IRAQIS HAD MISBEHAVED BADLY IN SYRIA AND WERE CAUSING HIM SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN JORDAN. THE IRAQIS HAD USED THEIR DIPLOMATIC STATUS IN JORDAN TO SMUGGLE PEOPLE IN AND OUT OF SYRIA. CURRENTLY JORDAN WAS LOOKING FOR ONE IRAQI WHO HAD COME INTO JORDAN FROM SYRIA IN THE TRUNK OF A DIPLOMATIC CAR AND WAS BELIEVED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RECENT MURDER OF IRAQI EXILE, AZZAWI IN SYRIA. JORDAN HAD PICKED UP TWO TRUCKLOADS OF ARMS BEING SMUGGLED THROUGH FROM IRAQ TO LEBANON AND HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF SUCH TRUCKS MIGHT HAVE GONE THROUGH EARLIER WITHOUT HAVING BEEN DISCOVERED.

17. ASAD HAD ARRESTED A PRO-LIBYAN GROUP IN SYRIA CONSISTING OF  
30 PLUS MEMBERS. ASAD WAS SICK AND TIRED OF JALLOUD WHOSE MAJOR  
PREOCCUPATION SEEMED TO BE SEEKING SYRIAN FACILITIES FOR  
"ENTERTAINMENT". KING TENDED TO BLAME EGYPT MORE THAN LIBYA  
FOR CURRENT BORDER TENSION.  
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